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Abstract—We sketch a series of studies and experiments 
designed to provide empirical evidence about the truth or falsity 
of claims that non-prescriptive approaches to standards demand 
greater competence from regulators than prescriptive 
approaches require. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Common usage today divides standards into two broad 
categories.  Prescriptive standards place specific requirements 
on development processes and practices. Non-prescriptive (also 
known as goal based, performance based, argument based, 
assurance case) standards place no restrictions on development 
processes, but require instead producing rigorous arguments 
that justify confidence that a system satisfies relevant 
properties [1][2]. 
Within certain domains, complying with a series of 
standards that tend to be more prescriptive than not is the 
primary means of receiving approval to release a system or 
vehicle to the public. In domains such as commercial aviation, 
this approach has been very successful.  Aviation companies 
have highly skilled people in the necessary technical 
disciplines who know how to comply with, and when 
necessary go beyond the requirements of, the existing 
standards.  Regulatory authorities also have highly skilled 
people in the necessary disciplines to assess compliance with 
the applicable standards (and any additional requirements that 
may be deemed to be appropriate for a particular system). 
A common criticism of relying on prescriptive standards is 
that it slows down, or perhaps even prohibits, the introduction 
of new technologies, including technologies that may be able 
to enhance safety.  Non-prescriptive standards, which contain 
no technology-specific requirements, are suggested by some to 
be a possible means to remove or at least lower the barrier to 
use of new technologies. 
Moving towards non-prescriptive standards is not without 
critics, however. A common criticism of non-prescriptive 
standards is that using them will increase substantially the 
intellectual burden on individuals within regulatory authorities 
by requiring unrealistic general levels of competence.  Whereas 
assessing compliance with a prescriptive standard only requires 
competence in the specific methods and processes dictated by 
the standard, assessing compliance with a non-prescriptive 
standard, the critics say, requires competence in all possible 
methods and processes that might be used, and competence in 
evaluating arguments. To do the job well, a regulator must not 
only be an engineer but also a philosopher or logician. 
Is this criticism valid? 
On first thought, it appears to be self-evidently so.  Surely, 
a person who is assessing products that are all developed using 
similar processes need not know as much about the technical 
discipline as a person who is assessing products that may be 
developed using any possible collection of processes.  
Likewise, a person who is assessing products that all use the 
same basic argument – compliance with the standard – to assert 
acceptability need not know as much about evaluating 
arguments as a person who may be confronted with an 
unconstrained collection of arguments. 
But that which is self-evidently so is not always truly so. 
We believe that studies and experiments should be conducted 
to provide empirical evidence about the truth or falsity of the 
claim that non-prescriptive approaches to standards demand 
greater competence from individual regulators than 
prescriptive approaches require1.  Our first thoughts on a 
possible structure of these studies and experiments follow. 
II. INITIAL DECISIONS 
Before conducting studies or designing experiments, 
several decisions must be made.  Among these decisions are 
the following: 
• Whether to concentrate on one or multiple domains.  
Because regulatory approaches differ substantially in 
different domains, the results obtained in one domain 
may or may not be applicable in another. 
• Whether to concentrate on one or multiple countries.  
Regulatory approaches in some domains try to be 
                                                            
1 A reviewer rightly noted that individual competence is not as 
important as organizational competence within a regulatory 
environment. We agree; one of us (Chris) is actively involved in 
investigating issues related to organizational competence. We focus 
here on individual competence because it is the specific issue that has 
been raised often in regards to the practicality of non-prescriptive 
standards, particularly by individual regulators themselves. 
consistent across national boundaries (aviation, for 
example); but this is not the case for other domains 
(rail, for example). 
• Whether to concentrate on one or multiple system 
attributes.  Studies and experiments designed to collect 
evidence about competency to assess if a system 
possesses a single attribute (safety, for example) will 
differ from studies and experiments with a broader 
scope. 
• What to try first: historical literature review, surveys, 
prototype case study, multiple case studies, small scale 
experiment, or something else. 
For the purposes of this position paper, we suggest that one 
reasonable set of decisions is the aviation domain, the US and 
European Union, safety, and starting with a survey followed by 
some small scale experiments. We suggest the aviation domain 
because current practices, which are based largely on 
prescriptive standards, have been widely successful, and 
assertions are commonly made that these regulatory practices 
inhibit innovation. Thus it is a domain with potentially high 
negative consequences of moving towards non-prescriptive 
standards prematurely, but also potentially high positive 
consequences of adopting such standards appropriately. We 
suggest the US and EU because they are responsible for the 
bulk of regulation within aviation. We suggest safety because 
ensuring adequate safety is the reason for many of the existing 
standards. 
III. A SURVEY 
The reason for starting with a survey is to collect 
information about the current state of practice, particularly as it 
is relevant to assessing current competency levels within 
regulatory bodies. This survey would solicit responses 
concerning education, post-college training, work activities 
including hours, knowledge about a variety of topics including 
reasoning and argumentation, how often certain types of 
knowledge are used on the job, perceived inadequacies in 
education and training for accomplishing necessary tasks, and 
undoubtedly some other relevant topics. 
We recognize that the likelihood that any regulatory 
authority will participate in this survey is rather small. We 
propose it nevertheless, because designing valid and 
informative experiments without accurate information about 
the current state is difficult.  Should a representative number of 
people respond to the survey, then a representative picture of 
may be drawn about what regulators currently do and what 
they now need to know to accomplish their jobs effectively. 
IV. SMALL EXPERIMENTS 
After the survey is conducted and analyzed, we propose 
that experiments be designed to test the following hypotheses:  
• Regulators possess the requisite knowledge to assess 
whether a system complies with current standards. 
(Within the aviation domain and the regulatory 
authorities suggested for these experiments, this 
hypothesis is almost certainly true.) 
• Regulators do not possess the requisite knowledge to 
evaluate the relative strengths of different arguments for 
the same conclusion. 
• Regulators do not possess the requisite knowledge to 
assess the adequacy of an argument that a system is 
safe, if that argument does not rely on compliance to  
current prescriptive standards.  
The likelihood that a statistically significant number of 
regulators will participate in experiments such as these is 
miniscule; but making the effort to find participants seems 
worthwhile nonetheless.  If a few regulators are willing to 
participate, then undertaking the experiments may yield 
illustrative, but by no means valid conclusive, results. 
Setting aside the question of whether subjects can be 
obtained for these experiments, considering how to design the 
experiments to test the suggested hypotheses is challenging. 
Among the challenges posed are these:  
• Creating a system and associated documentation that is 
realistic enough for experimental validity but simple 
enough to allow the ‘right’ answers to be determined. 
• Deciding how much, if any, training subjects should 
receive. 
• Determining how to present the arguments. 
• Creating the arguments so that a ‘right’ assessment of 
them exists. 
• Many other things not listed above. 
Of the three possible hypotheses we suggested, the second 
is the only one that may be feasible to simulate using non-
regulators.  Experiments with hypotheses related to 
comparative ability to evaluate argument strength have been 
done before, although no studies to our knowledge have 
specifically targeted regulators as the primary subject group.  
V. CONCLUSION 
We have presented some preliminary ideas designed to 
move towards empirically determining the truth or falsity of 
the claim that non-prescriptive approaches to standards demand 
greater competence from individual regulators than 
prescriptive approaches require.  No matter how appealing in 
theory non-prescriptive standards may be, if implementing 
such standards in practice is likely to reduce the effectiveness 
of regulatory oversight, then continuing with current 
approaches is a wiser choice. Enhancing and then following 
through on the ideas we have presented will be difficult, if not 
altogether impossible. Conducting the survey and studies we 
have sketched will not answer the question definitely, but it 
will move the discussion away from purely speculative 
opinions towards evidence-based opinions. 
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